



One Hundred Fifty Years  
of Electing Judges in Oregon: 
Will There Be Fifty More? 
he State of Oregon entered the Union on February 14, 1859, 
equipped with a constitution providing for direct competitive 
election of its judiciary.1  One hundred fifty years later,2 Oregonians 
still directly and competitively elect judges “for the term of [s]ix 
years”3 despite occasionally partisan and increasingly expensive 
judicial campaigns, academic and judicial criticism, and failed 
attempts to change their original choice by constitutional 
amendments.  Why did the delegates to Oregon’s Constitutional 
Convention choose to elect instead of appoint judges?  What light 
does a sesquicentennial perspective shed on improvements that should 
be made in how Oregon selects its judges? 
This Article contends that Oregonians’ decision to directly elect 
judges stemmed primarily from the broad agreement that judicial 
 
∗ The author is a member of the Oregon State Bar.  He served as legislative assistant to 
the late Oregon State Senator William (“Bill”) Frye in 1983 and as a Marion County, 
Oregon, Deputy District Attorney before joining the Oregon Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”).  For twenty-two years he practiced civil, criminal, and administrative law at 
DOJ, ending his career there on January 4, 2009, after eight years as Deputy Attorney 
General under Attorney General Hardy Myers.  In July 2009, he entered private practice 
with the law firm Harrang Long Gary Rudnick P.C. 
1 OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3.  By a “direct competitive election” the author means a 
popular election open to all candidates meeting the minimum legal qualifications for 
office. 
2 Sixty delegates convened in Salem on August 17, 1857, to draft Oregon’s 
Constitution.  They completed their work on September 18, 1857.  Oregonians approved 
the referred draft in a statewide election held on November 9, 1857.  OR. CONST. pmbl. 
(2007); CHARLES H. CAREY, GENERAL HISTORY OF OREGON 508, 510–11 (Binfords & 
Mort, 3d ed. 1971) (1922). 
3 OR. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (amended 1910). 
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power had grown too dominant and thus should be checked by the 
democratic influence of periodic competitive elections.  This 
agreement arose from the fact that by the time of the constitutional 
convention, judicial power had increased through the establishment 
and acceptance of judicial supremacy4 over the legislative and 
executive branches in regards to constitutional interpretation. 
Oregonians have rebuffed all attempts to reverse their original 
choice, and judicial supremacy remains the rule.  Although the U.S. 
Supreme Court has ruled that content-based restrictions on statements 
by candidates for elective judicial positions may violate the First 
Amendment,5 and despite escalating costs of campaigns for judicial 
office,6 Oregonians likely will still elect judges through direct 
competitive elections fifty years from now.  But long before the 
bicentennial, Oregonians should have improved the judicial-selection 
process by lengthening judicial terms and publicly funding judicial 
elections. 
Part I of this Article examines Oregonians’ original decision to 
select judges by direct competitive elections.  Part II outlines 
criticisms of that decision and describes attempts to reform or reverse 
it.  Part III recounts the history of direct competitive judicial elections 
in Oregon.  In the last Part, this Article suggests two modest reforms 
that are consistent with the rationale for Oregonians’ original choice 
yet address some of the criticisms of that choice. 
I 
THE ORIGINAL CHOICE 
In framing their constitution, Oregonians deliberately subordinated 
the judicial power to democratic limits.  Section A describes the 
records of the constitutional convention and the text of the 
constitution that the convention produced, as those records and text 
help reveal what Oregonians intended.  Section B uses Dred Scott v. 
 
4 “Judicial supremacy” is capable of multiple meanings.  For purposes of this Article, 
the expression refers to the power of the judicial branch of a democratic government to 
declare an exercise of the legislative or executive power unconstitutional with finality, 
barring subsequent amendment.  For a discussion of “the nature of judicial power and the 
[Supreme] Court’s own sense of strategic responsibility in the American constitutional 
system” in 1857, see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 209–35 (1978). 
5 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). 
6 Press Release, Justice at Stake, 2008 Supreme Court Elections: More Money, More 
Nastiness (Nov. 5, 2008), http://temp.justiceatstake.org/node/63. 
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Sandford to frame Oregonians’ original choice in the context of the 
judicial power and of the incandescent political issue of the time—
whether Oregon would be admitted as a state in which slavery was 
lawful. 
A.  The Convention and Its Product 
As the constitutional convention opened in Salem on August 17, 
1857, the delegates could have chosen any of several familiar models 
for selecting judges.  Although delegates had before them three 
examples of models featuring appointed judges, the delegates rejected 
all of them.7 
The first example of judicial appointment on which the delegates 
could have drawn was the frontier experience of the Hudson Bay 
Company.  Until 1846, when the Senate ratified the Oregon Treaty,8 
the Hudson Bay Company and its leader, Dr. John McLoughlin, 
exercised unelected de facto judicial authority over the land that 
became the Oregon Territory in 1849 and then became the State of 
Oregon ten years later.9 
Second, delegates could have created an appointed judiciary 
following the plan of the United States or as provided by the federal 
law that established the territorial government of Oregon.  The 
President of the United States is empowered, “by and with the 
[a]dvice and [c]onsent of the Senate,” to appoint judges to the 
Supreme Court and other courts.10  Once in office, federal judges 
serve “during good Behavior.”11  The President appointed judges in 
the Territory of Oregon, which was formally established in 1848, “by 
and with the advice and consent of the senate.”12  Delegates 
 
7 For a careful dissection of the records of the debate about article VII, see Claudia 
Burton, A Legislative History of the Oregon Constitution of 1857—Part II (Frame of 
Government: Articles III– VII), 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 245 (2003). 
8 Treaty with Great Britain in Regard to Limits Westward of the Rocky Mountains, 
U.S.-Gr. Brit.-Ir., July 17, 1846, 9 Stat. 869. 
9 Joe K. Stephens, Oregon Law Before Statehood: History and Sources, in 2 
PRESTATEHOOD LEGAL MATERIALS: A FIFTY-STATE RESEARCH GUIDE 957, 959 (Michael 
Chiorazzi & Marguerite Most eds., 2005); see generally DOROTHY NAFUS MORRISON, 
OUTPOST: JOHN MCLOUGHLIN & THE FAR NORTHWEST (1999) (giving an engrossing and 
comprehensive biography). 
10 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
11 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
12 THE ORGANIC AND OTHER GENERAL LAWS OF OREGON: TOGETHER WITH THE 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND OTHER PUBLIC ACTS AND STATUTES OF THE UNITED 
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confronted the federal example daily because they had selected 
Matthew P. Deady to chair the proceedings.  Deady concurrently 
served, by appointment of President Pierce, as Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the Territory of Oregon.13 
Delegates did discuss the federal model.  Delegate Delazon Smith 
expressly contrasted the federal system with existing state systems of 
electoral judicial selection.  The Oregon Statesman reported that 
during a debate Smith opined that “[i]t was not probable that [the 
states] would ever go back to the appointive system,” and that it was 
clear Smith “thought some of them would return to longer terms.”14 
Finally, the delegates could have followed the examples set by 
other states.15  The constitutions of all thirteen original states 
provided for appointment, not election, of judges.16  The delegates 
could have modeled Oregon’s constitution on any of them.  Fifty-
eight of the delegates were immigrants to the Oregon Territory from 
other states; it is likely that at least the nineteen lawyers among them 
were aware of the method of selecting judges in their original 
jurisdictions.17  Smith’s explicit comparison during debate of the 
federal system of appointing judges with the elective systems adopted 
by some states confirms that delegates of the Oregon Constitution 
also knew of systems in which judges were elected.  Additionally, the 
constitution of every state admitted between 1832 and 1858 provided 
for the direct competitive election of judges.18 
 
STATES: 1843–1872, at 57 (compiled by Matthew P. Deady & Lafayette Lane, 1874) 
(quoting § 11 of the Territorial Act) [hereinafter LAWS OF OREGON]. 
13 CAREY, supra note 2, at 495. 
14 The Constitutional Convention, OR. STATESMAN, Sept. 1, 1857 [hereinafter 
STATESMAN (Sept. 1, 1857)].  Asahel Bush, an ardent Democrat and a leader of the 
Democratic Party subset referred to by its rivals as the “Salem Clique,” edited and 
published the Oregon Statesman.  During the convention the newspaper printed close 
accounts of the debates.  CAREY, supra note 2, at 497. 
15 “The delegates to the Oregon Constitutional Convention were familiar with 
developments in other states.”  Burton, supra note 7, at 247 (noting, without specific 
reference to the selection of judges, the familiarity of various delegates with the records of 
deliberations in other states about other state constitutions). 
16 Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke, The Ideologies of Judicial Selection: Empiricism 
and the Transformation of the Judicial Selection Debate, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 551, 554 
(2008). 
17 CAREY, supra note 2, at 511 (describing geographic origins and professional 
backgrounds of delegates); see Burton, supra note 7, at 247. 
18 Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of 
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 716–17 (1995) (describing the status of states entering the 
Union). 
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Closer to home, immigrants’ most significant attempts at self-
governance predating the establishment of the Territory of Oregon 
featured elected instead of appointed judges.19  Oregon immigrants’ 
first effort to create a comprehensive system of self-governance 
occurred in July 1843.20  Immigrants to the Willamette Valley then 
adopted a code of laws they labeled the “Organic Law.”21  Article 4, 
section 7 of the Organic Law vested the judicial power in a 
“[s]upreme [j]udge and two [j]ustices of the [p]eace.”22  Officers 
chartered by the Organic Law were to be filled “by election in their 
several districts By Balet [sic] in the most central and convenient 
place in each district.”23 
Waves of immigrants continually reexamined and modified the 
Organic law.24  They eventually proposed the Organic Law of 1845, 
approved by voters at a special election on July 26, 1845.25  Article II, 
section 8 of the Organic Law of 1845 vested the judicial power in a 
“supreme court, and such inferior courts of law, equity and 
arbitration, as may, by law, from time to time be established.”26  The 
supreme court’s lone judge was to have been “elected by the house of 
 
19 Oregon was inhabited before it became a Territory of the United States.  Oregon’s 
original inhabitants had been self-governing for at least fourteen thousand years before 
any of the delegates to the convention were born.  M. Thomas P. Gilbert et al., DNA from 
Pre-Clovis Human Coprolites in Oregon, North America, 320 SCIENCE 786, 786–89 
(2008) (a cave in south-central Oregon yields DNA dating to 12,300 years B.C.).  For a 
readable and sympathetic survey of the long history of Oregon’s original human 
inhabitants, see STEPHEN DOW BECKHAM, THE INDIANS OF WESTERN OREGON: THIS 
LAND WAS THEIRS (1977). The extent to which immigrants’ political, social, and 
economic institutions were shaped by the culture and institutions of their well-established 
predecessors in the Oregon Territory is itself a largely unexplored frontier. 
20 JOHN A. HUSSEY, CHAMPOEG: PLACE OF TRANSITION 161–62 (1967).  In 1959 the 
Oregon State Highway Department called for a comprehensive study of Champoeg, an 
open prairie on the south bank of the Willamette River upstream from what is now known 
as Wilsonville.  Id. at 338.  Hussey was a National Park Service historian engaged by the 
Highway Department to help evaluate the area’s historical significance and possible 
federal recognition as a national historical site.  Id. at 338.  The immigrants to the region 
met numerous times beginning in 1843 to form provisional governments and enact 
“organic laws.”  Id. at xii. 
21 Id. at 161–62. 
22 Or. Historical Soc’y, The Oregon Archives, 1841–1843, at 60 OR. HIST. Q. 211, 275 
(David C. Duniway & Neil R. Riggs eds., 1959). 
23 Id. at 262. 
24 See generally HUSSEY, supra note 20, at 145–72 (describing the fits and starts of 
immigrants’ attempts to govern themselves between 1843 and 1849). 
25 LAWS OF OREGON, supra note 12, at 46 n.1. 
26 Id. at 49. 
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representatives.”27  But twelve years later when the constitutional 
convention adjourned, article VII of its product, which covered the 
judicial branch, provided for the direct competitive election of judges. 
As evidenced by records of the delegates’ debates and 
contemporaneous discussions of the draft constitution, no one seems 
to have doubted that the final product would provide for an elected 
judiciary.  The absence of debate on this point is all the more 
remarkable given that “[n]o other article was debated over as long a 
time, or amended as extensively, as the article on [the] judicial 
department.”28 
The delegates’ discussion of the length of the elective term for 
judicial offices nevertheless provides the foundation for strong 
inferences29 about their rationale.  In their debate over the length of 
judicial terms, delegates expressly invoked a democratic check on the 
power of the judiciary.  Delegates accepted the proposition that the 
election of judges would cause judges to reflect the concerns of the 
“common man” even as some of the delegates recognized and sought 
to limit the risk of what one delegate termed judicial 
“electioneering.”30 
Both Judge Deady and delegate Reuben P. Boise, an attorney who 
would later serve on the Oregon Supreme Court, favored terms longer 
than six years.  According to the Oregon Statesman, Deady “was for 
electing judges for a long term, and for giving them good fair 
salaries.”  Boise’s comments were reported at length: 
We ought to fix these terms so long as to remove the judges from 
politics, and from temptation to the making of the judgeship a 
stepping-stone to political promotion—to prostitute the ermine to 
political ends.  It was the great bane of impartiality and justice upon 
the bench.  It had been the study of governments to guard against 
this evil.  Elect your judges for short terms, and you would find 
them electioneering for the next term, upon the bench, or perhaps 
 
27 Id. 
28 Burton, supra note 7, at 393. 
29 Historians and lawyers may be more alike than either care to admit.  Both out of 
necessity draw constantly on inferences from often incomplete sets of facts.  Compare, 
e.g., UNIFORM OREGON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION 10.08 (proof may be by “proof of a 
chain of circumstances pointing to the existence or nonexistence of a certain fact”), with 
Robin W. Winks, Introduction to THE HISTORIAN AS DETECTIVE: ESSAYS ON EVIDENCE 
xvi (Robert W. Winks ed., Harper Colophon 1970) (“The historian must reconstruct events 
often hundreds of years in the past . . . when the full evidence will never be recoverable 
and, for that portion of it recovered, when it may have meanings other than we would 
attach to similar evidence today.”). 
30 STATESMAN (Sept. 1, 1857), supra note 14 (quoting Reuben P. Boise). 
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courting some other office.  Elect them for long terms, bind them by 
oath not to accept other office, and you direct their ambition in the 
line of the judiciary and have some guaranty of pure fountains of 
justice.31 
Delegate John Kelsay favored shorter terms.  The Oregon 
Statesman reported that Kelsay “was in favor of rotation in office, and 
in favor of giving other and common men a chance.”32  He thought 
“short term judges no more subject to political influences than long 
term ones.”33  But Smith had the last word on the length of judicial 
terms.  After comparing state systems of elective judges to the 
federal-appointment system and arguing for a term of office longer 
than six years, Smith asserted that “[t]he frequent return of power to 
the people was a good rule applied to the executive and legislative 
departments of government.”34  Smith’s implicit contention was that 
the rule was equally sound as applied to the judicial department. 
The text of other elements of the constitution tends to confirm 
delegates’ intent to subordinate the judicial power to democratic 
limits.  For example, the original Oregon Constitution provided two 
methods of removing an incumbent judge from office during the 
judge’s term.  Article VII, section 19 provided that, after a trial in 
circuit court, any public officer could be tried for “incompetency, 
corruption, malfeasance, or delinquency in office . . . in the same 
manner as criminal offences.”  Grand juries initiated all criminal 
proceedings.35  Article VII, section 20 permitted the Governor, upon 
resolution by the Legislative Assembly, to remove Supreme Court 
justices for “incompetency, Corruption, malfeasance or delinquency 
in office, or other sufficient cause.”  Both of the removal provisions 
were initiated by electors—directly in the case of grand-jury 
presentment and indirectly in the case of legislative resolution. 
In contrast to the U.S. Constitution, Oregon’s original constitution 
did not include any prohibition against reductions in judicial salaries 






35 OR. CONST. art. VII, § 18.  See State v. Gortmaker, 295 Or. 505, 513–16, 668 P.2d 
354, 358–61 (1983) (discussing the history of Oregon, and the grand jury system, 
including the 1899 amendment allowing alternatives to grand jury indictment). 
36 A committee did report a section limiting reduction in judicial salaries.  The 
committee’s report, however, was not adopted.  Burton, supra note 7, at 451. 
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Legislative Assembly the exclusive power to raise revenue and barred 
any expenditure by any means except “appropriations made by 
law.”37  Other state constitutions also lacked a protective salary-bar 
and granted broad spending authority; Alexis de Tocqueville observed 
this was “a practice that necessarily subjects [judges] to [the 
legislature’s] immediate influence.”38  Lastly, justices of the Oregon 
Supreme Court were elected by district39 instead of in statewide 
elections in which distinct geographic interests presumably would be 
muted. 
The delegates’ debates, and the text of the constitution they 
referred to the voters, support the inference that the delegates acted 
intentionally to check the power of the judiciary by subordinating it to 
direct or indirect (through the powers granted to the Assembly) 
democratic action.  Events outside their meeting room buttress the 
inference.  Those events are discussed in Section B. 
B.  The Original Choice Through the Lens of Dred Scott 
On March 6, 1857, six months before Oregon’s constitutional 
convention convened, Chief Justice Roger Taney issued the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s judgment in Dred Scott v. Sandford.40  Scott 
 
37 OR. CONST. art. IV, § 18 (“[B]ills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of 
Representatives.”), and art. IX, § 4 (“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in 
pursuance of appropriations made by law.”). 
38 I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 155 (Francis Bowen trans., 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 14th prtg, 1984) (1835). 
39 OR. CONST. art. VII, § 2.  In 1910, an initiative petition adopted by the people 
amended the constitution to allow the Legislature to eliminate district elections for judges 
with statewide appellate jurisdiction.  OR. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (amended 1910).  The 
Legislature subsequently exercised that power.  In 2006 a proposal to revert to election by 
district reached the ballot by initiative petition.  A supporter of the proposal wrote that it 
would cause the Oregon Supreme Court to “better reflect Oregon’s citizens—not just 
lawyers—if judges ran from district similar to those that divide Oregon into five 
Congressional districts.”  Official Voters’ Pamphlet, State Measures, Oregon General 
Election, Nov. 7, 2006, at 19, available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov72006/ 
guide/meas/m40_fav.html (quoting an argument in favor of Ballot Measure 40, submitted 
by eleven district attorneys).  Opponents argued “Judges are not elected to represent 
people, regions, or political viewpoints; rather they interpret, administer and uphold the 
constitution and laws.  Unlike legislators, who are charged with representing regional 
constituents, the role of judges is to fairly and impartially apply the law without regard to 
political ideology or geography.”  Or. State Bar, Constitutional Amendment 40 Position 
Paper, http://www.osbar.org/_docs/lawimprove/06_OSBposition40.pdf (last visited May 
4, 2009). 
40 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
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contended that he was freed by the fact of his residence for a time in a 
territory of the United States in which slavery was prohibited. 
The court ordered the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of 
Missouri to dismiss Scott’s claim to be a free person “for the want of 
jurisdiction in that court.”41  The Chief Justice declared that 
the act of Congress [referring to one of the statutory elements of the 
Missouri Compromise] which prohibited a citizen from holding and 
owning property of this kind in the territory of the United States 
north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the 
Constitution, and is therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott 
himself, nor any of his family, were made free by being carried into 
this territory . . . .”42 
The Court expressly held unconstitutional the statutory components of 
the Missouri Compromise.43  Contemporaries widely understood 
Dred Scott to hold that Congress could not constitutionally prohibit 
slavery in any territory.44  Abraham Lincoln, among others, believed 
that Dred Scott inescapably presaged an opinion declaring 
unconstitutional any state’s effort to prohibit slavery: 
I think myself, and I repeat it here, that this decision does not 
merely carry slavery into the Territories, but by its logical 
conclusion it carries it into the States in which we live. 45 
If Lincoln were right, Oregon’s new constitution could not 
constitutionally prohibit slavery; and yet prohibiting slavery in the 
new state was precisely what an overwhelming majority of voters in 
the territory wished to do, as subsequent events would demonstrate.  
Dred Scott, slavery, and their incendiary implications dominated the 
windup to Oregon’s constitutional convention. 
 
41 Nat’l Archives & Records, Civil War and Reconstruction (1850–1877): Dred Scott 
Decision, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/american_originals/scott.html (last visited 
May 4, 2009) (providing an image of the Chief Justice’s one-page judgment). 
42 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452. 
43 See id.  The “Missouri Compromise” temporarily resolved the gridlock of 1819–1830 
between southern and northern members of Congress over the admission of Missouri and 
Maine and the extension of slavery to territories north and south of 36° 30'.  
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 100–13. 
44 “For there can be no doubt that Taney’s opinion was accepted as the opinion of the 
Court by its critics as well as its defenders.  In all branches of government and in popular 
thought, the “Dred Scott decision” came to mean the opinion of the Chief Justice.”  
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 333–34. 
45 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Columbus, Ohio (Sept. 16, 1859), in III THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 420–21 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
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On July 28, 1857, Asahel Bush published on the front page of his 
Oregon Statesman a lengthy letter from his close political ally, fellow 
Democrat, and soon-to-be delegate to the constitutional convention, 
George Williams.46  While declaring his preference for a free Oregon 
and omitting any reference to Dred Scott by name, Williams 
confronted directly the Supreme Court’s opinion and just as directly 
rejected it: 
I contend that we have a perfect right to have slavery or not, as we 
please. 
. . . . 
I take the ground that the General Government has no right in any 
way to interfere with slavery, except to carry out the fugitive slave 
clause of the constitution, and have maintained the opinion that 
each State and Territory has the absolute right to establish, modify, 
or prohibit slavery within its borders, subject only to the 
Constitutional restriction [allowing a federal fugitive slave law].47 
A week later another Oregonian took the opposite position in terms 
that plainly evidence knowledge of the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Dred Scott: 
There are many reasons why Oregon should become a slave State. 
. . . . 
[T]he narrow-minded abolitionists and shallow-brained 
republican[s] . . . trample the Constitution of the United States 
under foot and denounce the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States as being a southern one.48 
Williams’ position proved by far the more popular.  Delegates to 
the constitutional convention referred to the people several questions 
subsidiary to the approval or rejection of their draft.49  One of those 
questions was: “Do you vote for Slavery in Oregon?  Yes, or No.”50  
On November 9, 1857, voters cast 7727 votes against slavery and 
2645 for it.51  By prohibiting slavery, Oregonians exercised a political 
power that the appointed judiciary of the U.S. Supreme Court implied 
that states did not possess. 
 
46 Slavery in Oregon, OR. STATESMAN, July 28, 1857 (letter of George Williams). 
47 Id. 
48 The Slavery Question, OR. STATESMAN, Aug. 4, 1857, at 4 (Letter of F.B. Martin). 
49 OR. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2. 
50 Id. 
51 SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUE BOOK: ALMANAC AND FACT BOOK 353 
(2007–2008). 
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For Oregonians in the summer of 1857, Dred Scott focused 
attention on the federal judiciary’s power to declare laws 
unconstitutional as applied to the most important political and social 
issue of the day.  That power had evolved in the eighty years since the 
U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of the original states were 
adopted.  By 1857 the Supreme Court had long since discovered in its 
charter the conclusive authority (barring subsequent amendment) to 
instruct the other branches as to the meaning of the words of the 
constitution.52  Dred Scott was all the more inflammatory given the 
broad acceptance, by Democrats and Republicans alike, of the 
proposition that the U.S. Supreme Court is empowered to rule on the 
constitutionality of statutes. 
Democrats invoked the principle of judicial supremacy, and 
centrist Republicans, reluctant to repudiate the principle, sought to 
distinguish the Court’s opinion.  Democrats like Stephen Douglas 
insisted that the nation must acquiesce to the Supreme Court’s 
opinion. 
The courts are the tribunals prescribed by the Constitution and 
created by the authority of the people to determine, expound and 
enforce the law.  Hence, whoever resists the final decision of the 
highest judicial tribunal, aims a deadly blow to our whole 
Republican system of government—a blow, which if successful 
would place all our rights and liberties at the mercy of passion, 
anarchy and violence.53 
Lincoln disclaimed resistance to the Court’s opinion: 
 We believe, as much as Judge Douglas, (perhaps more) in 
obedience to, and respect for the judicial department of government.  
We think its decisions on Constitutional questions, when fully 
settled, should control, not only the particular cases decided, but the 
general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by 
amendments of the Constitution as provided in that instrument 
itself.  More than this would be revolution.54 
 
52 The Supreme Court had, before Dred Scott, frequently asserted or implied the power 
to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional, “and the existence of such power was 
widely assumed by the American people” in 1857.  FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 4. 
53 Lincoln, supra note 45, at 401 (quoting Stephen A. Douglas’s speech at Springfield, 
Illinois, on June 26, 1857). 
54 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in II THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 401 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
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Lincoln’s “respect” for the decision was limited, however, to the 
decision “in so far as it decided in favor of Dred Scott’s master and 
against Dred Scott and his family.”55  Lincoln said that Douglas: 
[W]ould have the citizen conform his vote to that decision; the 
Member of Congress, his; the President, his use of the veto power.  
He would make it a rule of political action for the people and all the 
departments of the government.  I would not.  By resisting it as a 
political rule, I disturb no right of property, create no disorder, 
excite no mobs.56 
The evolution and ultimate establishment of the judiciary’s power 
to declare unconstitutional laws passed by its coordinate legislature is 
a story beyond the scope of this Article.  It is important to note, 
however, that the judiciary’s triumph over lawmakers evolved over 
the same decades in which states shifted from appointed to elective 
judiciaries and crystallized in the form of Dred Scott immediately 
before Oregon’s constitutional convention convened in 1857.57  That 
triumph left the makers of the Oregon Constitution, and the makers of 
every other state constitution drafted during the maturation of the 
principle of judicial supremacy, with an enduring problem.  A modern 
political scientist, Robert Dahl, framed the problem as follows: 
 If a law has been properly passed by the lawmaking branches of 
a democratic government, why should judges have the power to 
declare it unconstitutional?  If you could simply match the 
intentions and words of the law against the words of the 
constitution, perhaps a stronger case could be made for judicial 
review.  But in all important and highly contested cases, that is 
simply impossible.  Inevitably, in interpreting the constitution 
judges bring their own ideology, biases, and preferences to bear.58  
American legal scholars have struggled for generations to provide a 
satisfactory rationale for the extensive power of judicial review that 
 
55 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (July 17, 1858), in II THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 54, at 516. 
56 Id. 
57 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 4, at 4. 
58 ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 55 (2002).  
Lawyers and judges debate the “inevitability” of this conclusion.  The Supreme Court 
agrees.  “Not only do state-court judges possess the power to ‘make’ common law, but 
they have the immense power to shape the States’ constitutions as well.”  Republican Party 
of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002).  The Court’s view of the state court process 
contrasts sharply with the perspective expressed by eight states, participating as friends of 
the court in the Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly: “[T]he judicial process is not one of 
debating toward what the law should be.  It is rather the finding of what the law is.”  Brief 
Amicus Curiae of California, Arizona, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas and 
Washington in Support of Respondents at 6, No. 01-521 (8th Cir. Feb. 19, 2002). 
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has been wielded by our Supreme Court.  But the contradiction 
remains between imbuing an unelected body—or in the American 
case, five out of nine justices on the Supreme Court—with the 
power to make policy decisions that affect the lives and welfare of 
millions of Americans.  How, if at all, can judicial review be 
justified in a democratic order?59 
Dred Scott focused a spotlight on that question on the eve of 
Oregon’s constitutional convention.60  Had Dahl published his 
question as a letter to the editor of the Oregon Statesman in the 
summer of 1857, every reader would instantly have understood him to 
refer to Dred Scott.  Dahl’s question, though unstated, hung heavy 
over the convention.  The delegates answered the question by 
establishing a system in which judges are chosen in direct competitive 
elections.  As a result of their decision, no tension arises currently in 
Oregon between the creation of law by democratic processes and the 
judiciary’s power to declare laws unconstitutional.  Although 
Oregonians repeatedly have revisited the question, their original 
answer has endured. 
II 
CRITIQUES OF THE ORIGINAL CHOICE AND FAILED ATTEMPTS 
AT REVISION 
In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville linked the existence of the principle 
of judicial supremacy to the limitations placed on that power by state 
constitutions. 
 Armed with the power of declaring the laws to be 
unconstitutional, the American magistrate perpetually interferes in 
political affairs. . . .  I am aware that a secret tendency to diminish 
the judicial power exists in the United States . . . .  Some other state 
constitutions make the members of the judiciary elective, and they 
are even subjected to frequent re-elections.  I venture to predict that 
these innovations will sooner or later be attended with fatal 
consequences; and that it will be found out at some future period 
that by thus lessening the independence of the judiciary they have 
 
59 DAHL, supra note 58, at 55. 
60 In addition to F.B. Martin’s rebuttal to George Williams’s rejection of Dred Scott, the 
Oregon Statesman of August 4, 1857, carried a report of the transformation of Marion 
County’s courthouse into a space suitable “for the sittings of the Constitutional 
Convention.”  It also carried Bush’s editorial declaring himself “for a free State in 
Oregon,” provided free negroes were excluded, whites were barred from transporting 
slaves into Oregon, negroes were prohibited from acquiring real estate, and negroes were 
prohibited from suing or being sued in state courts.  The Constitution and Negroes, OR. 
STATESMAN, Aug. 4, 1857. 
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attacked not only the judicial power, but the democratic republic 
itself.61 
For more than a century, bar associations and other professional 
associations have counseled against the perceived excesses of direct 
competitive elections.62  Academics,63 distinguished practitioners,64 
lawyer-novelists,65 and the Oregon Supreme Court66 have all 
expressed alarm about the implications of the choice made more than 
150 years ago.  Judges have joined this chorus.  In 2002, Paul De 
Muniz, now Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court, and at the 
time an associate justice of that court, wrote that: 
[C]onstitutional scholars, historians, social commentators, the 
American Bar Association, and watchdog groups are now voicing 
grave concern that state supreme court elections are being 
transformed into purely political affairs at odds with the 
independent and impartial role that judges and courts must perform 
under America’s three-branch system of government.67 
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have expressed concern about 
direct competitive election of state judges.  Justice O’Connor believes 
that relying on campaign contributions “may leave judges feeling 
indebted to certain parties or interest groups” and that even the 
public’s perception of the possibility of such indebtedness “is likely to 
 
61 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 38, at 279 (footnote omitted). 
62 “By the early twentieth century, elective judiciaries were increasingly viewed as 
plagued by incompetence and corruption—a view that in 1913 led Herbert Harley, Albert 
Kales, Roscoe Pound, John Wigmore, and others to establish the American Judicature 
Society (“AJS”) in the pursuit of judicial reform.”  Croley, supra note 18, at 723. 
63 See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, State Courts and Republican Government, 41 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 951, 965 n.54 (2001). 
64 See, e.g., David B. Frohnmayer, Election of State Appellate Judges: The Demise of 
Democratic Premises, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1251 (2003). 
65 JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL 218 (2008). 
66 In re Fadeley, 310 Or. 548, 563, 802 P.2d 31, 40 (1990) (“The stake of the public in a 
judiciary that is both honest in fact and honest in appearance is profound.  A democratic 
society that, like ours, leaves many of its final decisions, both constitutional and otherwise, 
to its judiciary is totally dependent on the scrupulous integrity of that judiciary.  A judge’s 
direct request for campaign contributions offers a quid pro quo or, at least, can be 
perceived by the public to do so.  Insulating the judge from such direct solicitation 
eliminates the appearance (at least) of impropriety and, to that extent, preserves the 
judiciary’s reputation for integrity.”). 
67 Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to Judicial 
Independence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 367, 368 (2002). 
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undermine the public’s confidence in the judiciary.”68  Additionally, 
Justices Kennedy and Breyer recently observed: 
 When one considers that elections require candidates to conduct 
campaigns and to raise funds in a system designed to allow for 
competition among interest groups and political parties, the 
persisting question is whether that process is consistent with the 
perception and the reality of judicial independence and judicial 
excellence.  The rule of law, which is a foundation of freedom, 
presupposes a functioning judiciary respected for its independence, 
its professional attainments, and the absolute probity of its judges.  
And it may seem difficult to reconcile these aspirations with 
elections.69 
Some scholars recently have attempted empirical evaluations of the 
arguments for and against direct competitive election of judges.70  
Their efforts have yielded no knockout blow in either direction, but 
the effort to quantify the risks inhering from the direct competitive 
election of judges seems unlikely to flag.71 
Given the steady drumbeat of criticism, it is not surprising that 
proposals have been advanced in Oregon to eliminate direct 
competitive judicial elections, or to minimize their perceived 
disadvantages.  Coincident with the state’s centennial, voters 
approved article XVII, section 2 of the Oregon Constitution.  It 
permitted the Legislative Assembly, on the agreement of “at least 
two-thirds of all the members of each house,” to propose to the voters 
constitutional revisions embracing more than one subject.72  The 
Legislature created a Commission for Constitutional Revision in 1961 
in preparation for the exercise of its new authority.73  In 1962 the 
Commission proposed a new constitution to the Legislature.74 
Article VI of the Commission’s proposal described the judiciary.  
Judges were to be appointed by the Governor and were thereafter 
 
68 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
69 N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 803 (2008) (Kennedy & 
Breyer, JJ., concurring). 
70 Saphire & Moke, supra note 16, at 565–73 (surveying empirical studies; concluding 
that the results of empirical studies provide “mixed” support for reform). 
71 Id. 
72 H.R.J. Res. 5, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1959 Or. Laws 1535 (approved by voters Nov. 
8, 1960). 
73 COMM’N FOR CONST. REVISION, A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR OREGON: A REPORT TO 
THE GOVERNOR AND THE 52ND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 35 (1962); S.J. Res. 20, 1961 
Or. Laws 1514. 
74 COMM’N FOR CONST. REVISION, supra note 73, at 1–30. 
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subject to retention elections in which voters were to be asked simply 
whether the judge was to be retained.75  If the people answered 
affirmatively the judge would serve an additional term of six years, 
but if they answered negatively the seat would be declared vacant, 
and the Governor would exercise the appointment power.76  A 
majority of the Commission contended that direct competitive 
elections offer the people no genuine choice.  The Commission 
argued that a voter “has no basis on which to make a choice unless it 
is anger toward an incumbent for a past decision rendered honestly, 
and the candidate cannot give the voter a basis without compromising 
his judicial independence if elected.”77 
Two members of the Oregon House of Representatives also serving 
on the Commission dissented from the Commission’s proposal.78  
They prophetically focused on the judicial article and particularly on 
the proposed elimination of the direct competitive election of judges.  
One of the dissenting legislators wrote “Section 8 of Article VI 
provides for the appointment of judges and this takes from the people 
their opportunity to vote for judges in a positive way. . . .  When we 
have a highly adequate system why instigate a change that is highly 
controversial?”79 
In 1963 the Commission’s proposal passed the House with the 
requisite two-thirds majority, but it failed in the Senate.80  Until 1969, 
successive biennial struggles failed to attract sufficient votes in the 
House, Senate, or both, for referral of a revision to the people.  The 
Measure81 finally referred in 1969 appeared on the May 26, 1970, 
primary-election ballot as Ballot Measure 3.  But by then, section 8 of 
article VI of the Commission’s original proposal for reformation of 
the judicial-selection process had been transformed into an 
affirmation of the original constitution.  Ballot Measure 3 (1970) 
stated that: “Judges of courts in the judicial system shall be elected at 
 
75 Id. at 17. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 43. 
78 See id. at 5. 
79 Id. at 54 (Statement of Representative Stafford Hansell).  Representative Thomas 
Mahoney dissented from the report and specifically from the Commission’s recommended 
section 8 of article VI on the ground that Senate confirmation of the Governor’s appointee 
was an essential component of an appointive system.  Id. at 56–57.  The Commission’s 
proposal did not provide for Senate confirmation of the Governor’s appointee. 
80 H.J. Res. 1, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1963). 
81 S.J. Res. 23, 55th Leg., 1969 Or. Laws 1951. 
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regular general elections by the voters of the state or appropriate 
geographical district.”82  The people capped the decade-long 
adventure by trouncing Ballot Measure 3 (1970), 182,074 for and 
322,682 against.83  Nothing in the arguments about the Measure 
suggests that the people rejected it because they preferred the 
Commission’s original proposal for an appointed judiciary to the final 
proposal affirming the existing constitution.84 
Opponents of the direct competitive election of judges tried again 
in 1977.  In that year, the Legislative Assembly passed Senate Joint 
Resolution 6,85 referring to the people a constitutional amendment 
modifying the system of direct competitive election of judges.  The 
referred measure appeared on the November 7, 1978, general election 
ballot as Ballot Measure 1.86  Under Section 1 of the Measure, the 
successor to a circuit judge serving a full term would have been 
selected by the people in a direct competitive election.87  Section 2 
provided a very different approach for selecting judges exercising 
statewide territorial jurisdiction.88  As to those judges, a “nonpartisan 
judicial nominating commission” would have presented to the 
Governor a report identifying “well-qualified” candidates.89  The 
Governor would choose from the presented list.  Once appointed, the 
incumbent would have been required to stand for a confirmation 
election in which the only question presented would be: “Shall Judge 
(naming him or her) be elected to succeed (himself or herself, as 
appropriate) as judge of the (name of court)?”90 
Opponents of the referred measure echoed the views expressed by 
John Kelsay and Delazon Smith at the Constitutional Convention 
 
82 Ballot Measure 3, Official Voters’ Pamphlet, pt. 1, Oregon Democratic Party Primary 
Nominating Election, no. 1, May 26, 1970, 19–44 (quoting article VI, section 7). 
83 SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUE BOOK, INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND 
RECALL: 1958–1970, http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections18.htm (last 
visited May 5, 2009). 
84 Official Voters’ Pamphlet, pt. 1, Oregon Democratic Party Primary Nominating 
Election, no. 1, May 26, 1970, at 10–45 (The arguments for and against Ballot Measure 3 
are on pages 10–18.). 
85 S.J. Res. 6, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1977 Or. Laws 1090. 
86 Ballot Measure 1, Official Voters’ Pamphlet, Oregon General Election, no. 1, Nov. 7, 
1978, at 4. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 S.J. Res. 6, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1977 Or. Laws 1090. 
90 Id. 
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about the beneficial effects of frequent judicial elections.91  The 
opponents answered emphatically Robert Dahl’s question: 
 The judiciary, at both trial and appellate levels, is a consistent 
and highly significant voice in the formulation of public policy.  As 
such it must be representative of and accountable to the people of 
this state, and the only way this accountability can be guaranteed is 
through the present election process by which outstanding Oregon 
judges have been selected for decades.92 
 . . . . 
 IF YOU’RE SMART ENOUGH TO ELECT A GOVERNOR 
AND A LEGISLATURE, WHY WON’T THEY ALLOW YOU 
TO ELECT JUDGES?93 
 . . . . 
 Our courts exercise ever-growing power over our economic and 
political rights and liberties.  Therefore, it is ever more vital that 
judges remain effectively accountable to the voters.94 
The people rejected the proposal by a vote of 358,504 for and 
449,132 against.95  It is as close as Oregon ever has come to 
eliminating the direct competitive election of judges.  Its defeat is 
consistent with the modern trend as exhibited in other states since the 
mid-1980s.96 
 
91 See supra Part I.A. 
92 Official Voters’ Pamphlet, Oregon General Election, no. 1, Nov. 7, 1978, at 6 
(quoting Harl Haas and John Ray’s “Argument in Opposition” to Ballot Measure 1). 
93 Id. (quoting the Women’s Legislative Council’s “Argument in Opposition” to Ballot 
Measure 1). 
94 Id. at 7 (quoting Henry Kane’s “Argument in Opposition” to Ballot Measure 1). 
95 SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUE BOOK, INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND 
RECALL: 1972–1978, http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections19.htm (last 
visited May 5, 2009). 
96 “[S]ince the mid-1980s, voters in several states have rejected merit proposals by 
substantial margins.  In five other states, legislative proposals for reform of the judicial 
selection system have repeatedly failed.”  Saphire & Moke, supra note 16, at 556 (footnote 
omitted). 
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III 
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY YEARS UNDER THE ORIGINAL CHOICE 
Aggregate information about appellate court97 elections hints at 
some intriguing patterns but does little to help evaluate key criticisms 
or formulate remedies.  The data are set out in Table 1. 
More than sixty percent of Oregon Supreme Court justices who 
have served first gained office through gubernatorial appointment.  
Almost eighty percent of court of appeals judges initially reached 
office by appointment.  Approximately seventy-three percent of the 
justices initially appointed to the bench later won office by election.  
And 93.5% of judges of the court of appeals originally appointed 
were later elected. 
TABLE 198 
































































Table 1 neither informs one of the number of contested elections 
nor helps evaluate the quality or tenor of such elections.  Statements 
submitted by judicial candidates and their supporters for publication 
in voters’ pamphlets published by the Oregon Secretary of State do, 
however, permit one to sample the quality and tenor of direct 
 
97 Year-by-year review of trial court elections in each of Oregon’s thirty-six counties 
likely would shed further light on the consequences of the original choice.  The author did 
not attempt that monumental undertaking. 
98 The Oregon Blue Book, published by the Secretary of State, contains lists exhibiting 
the tenure of each judge of the court of appeals and justice of the supreme court.  Data in 
this table were derived from that source.  SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUE BOOK, 
STATE OFFICIALS HISTORY, http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections23.htm 
(last visited June 17, 2009). 
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competitive elections in Oregon.  Table 2 is based on examination of 
all the voters’ pamphlets published for statewide elections between 
1934 and 2006.  The Table includes thirty-seven electoral cycles.  
Each “cycle” could include a primary and general election for the 
same contested seat.  One or more direct competitive elections 
occurred in twenty-three of the electoral cycles.  No contested 
election for a supreme court or court of appeals seat occurred in years 
between 1934–2006 and omitted from Table 2. 
 
TABLE 299 












1934 1  Bagley v. Rand (Primary) 
1938 1  Bean v. Zimmerman (General) 
1950 1  Tooze v. Dunn v. McGuire (Primary) 
1956 1  Lusk v. Sandblast (Primary) 
1958 2  Sloan v. Overhulse v. Bowe (Primary) 
Rossman v. Lee (Primary) 
1962 1  Denecke v. Wolff (Primary) 
1964 1  Holman v. Howell v. Fort v. Lee (Primary) 
Holman v. Howell (General) 
1968 1  McAllister v. Lenske (Primary) 
1974 1 1 McAllister v. Lent (Primary – S.Ct) 
Lee v. Tanzer (Primary – CA) 
1976 1 3 
Lent v. Field (Primary – S. Ct.) 
Johnson v. Kane v. Lucas v. Chez (Primary 
– CA pos. 1) 
Schwab v. Kitson  
(Primary – CA pos. 3) 
Richardson v. Fort  
(Primary – CA pos. 4) 
1980 1 2 
Peterson v. Field v. Wolff (Primary – S. Ct) 
Peterson v. Field (General – S. Ct) 
VanHoomison v. Warden (Primary – CA 
pos. 2) 
Warren v. Brown  
(Primary – CA pos. 6) 
 
99 The Oregon Supreme Court Law Library holds a bound collection of voters’ 
pamphlets published since 1902 by the Secretary of State.  The collection appears 
incomplete for elections before 1934.  Table 2 is based on the author’s examination of all 
of the collected pamphlets with special emphasis on those published from 1934 forward. 















1984 1 0 
Linde v. Norblad v. Nissman (Primary) 
Linde v. Norblad (General) 
1986 0 1 Deits v. Erwin (Primary) 
1988 2 0 
VanHoomison v. Buttler (Primary – Pos. 2) 
Fadeley v. Cook v. Jelderks v. Bearden 
(Primary – Pos. 4) 
Fadeley v. Cook (General – Pos. 4) 
1994 0 1 Armstrong v. Adamson (General) 
1996 1 0 
Kulongoski v. Armstrong v. Yraguen 
(Primary) 
1998  2 
Riggs v. Tiernan v. Westwood v. Rice v. 
Hoffer (Primary, Pos. 7) 
Riggs v. Tiernan (General, Pos. 7: Tiernan 
withdrew after the primary but before the 
election) 
Warden v. Jackson (Primary, Pos. 6) 
2000 1 0 
DeMuniz v. Byrne v. Merten v. Niven v. 
Hatfield (Primary) 
DeMuniz v. Byrne (General) 
2002 0 1 Schuman v. Hunnicutt (Primary) 
2004 2 1 
Kistler v. Leuenberger (Primary – S. Ct. 
pos. 4) 
Riggs v. Murgo  
(Primary – S. Ct. pos. 7) 
Wollheim v. Brockett (Primary – CA pos 7) 
2006 1 0 Linder v. Roberts v. Hallman (Primary) 
Linder v. Roberts (General) 
 
Most of the published statements of candidates and their supporters 
in the contested elections listed in Table 2 are fairly described as self-
restrained, nonpartisan, and biographical.  Most candidates and their 
supporters eschewed specific commentary on substantive issues 
already decided by, or likely to be pending before, the court.  Chief 
Justice Bean’s brief statement in the 1938 voters’ pamphlet succinctly 
captures the spirit animating many of the statements: “Partisan 
questions are not involved in the election of judge.”100  On that spare 
platform, and on the record compiled in four terms on the supreme 
 
100 Official Voters’ Pamphlet, Oregon Regular General Election, no. 1, Nov. 8, 1938, at 
71. 
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court bench, Chief Justice Bean was reelected for the fifth and final 
time.101 
Even the voters’ pamphlets, however, contain a few issue-specific 
commentaries and overtly political appeals.  In 1956, a nonlawyer 
candidate urged voters to choose “from the ranks of Labor Union and 
women.”102  In 1958, a challenger criticized the personal productivity 
of the incumbent justice in his voters’ pamphlet statement; in the 
same pamphlet, there appeared a “statement opposing the 
nomination” of the challenger and two surrebuttals to the statement 
opposing the nomination of the challenger.103  In 1968, a candidate 
seized the bully pulpit of his candidacy to urge judges to speak out 
against the war in Vietnam.104  In 1984, one of the candidates in a 
three-way primary race for a supreme court position asserted that 
“THE INCUMBENT IS OUT OF TOUCH WITH OREGONIANS     
. . .  All too often his major concern has been for the criminal, not the 
crime victim.”105  Crime emerged again as an explicit issue in 2000, 
when a challenger’s supporter contended in the voters’ pamphlet that 
the incumbent, formerly a court of appeals judge, had “sided with 
criminal defendants in four of his five opinions reviewed by the 
Supreme Court.”106 
The Oregon Secretary of State mails voters’ pamphlets to every 
registered voter.  But while the pamphlets are a critically important 
aspect of a judicial campaign, they certainly are not the only measure 
of its tenor and content.  Indeed, the nonpartisan tone generally 
exhibited in voters’ pamphlets since 1938 is not characteristic of any 
judicial campaign occurring between statehood and 1931, because 
judicial elections were expressly partisan throughout that period. 
 
101 SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUE BOOK, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES OF 
OREGON, http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections27.htm (last visited May 5, 
2009). 
102 Official Voters’ Pamphlet pt. 2, Oregon Nonpartisan Judiciary Offices, Primary 
Election, no. 60, May 18, 1956, at 5 (quoting L.B. “Sandy” Sandblast). 
103 Official Voters’ Pamphlet, Oregon Democratic Party Primary Nominating Election, 
no. 1, May 16, 1958, at 14–19. 
104 Official Voters’ Pamphlet, Democratic Party Nominating Election, May 28, 1968, at 
109 (statement of Reuben Lenske, candidate for Judge of the Supreme Court, Pos. No. 1). 
105 Official Voters’ Pamphlet, Oregon Primary Election, no. 13, May 15, 1984, at 73 
(quoting David Marshall Nissman’s statement). 
106 Official Voters’ Pamphlet, Oregon General Election, no. 1, Nov. 7, 2000, at 24 
(quoting Steve Doell in statement of Greg Byrne). 
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Under the territorial laws in effect until 1859, voters either handed 
election officials a party-supplied and color-coded ticket107 listing the 
party’s preferred candidates or voted aloud and publicly.108  Oregon’s 
constitution changed the territorial voting procedure.  Under the 
original constitution, voters were required to declare publicly their 
votes, a system known as viva voce voting.109  Although no longer a 
necessity after the constitution established viva voce voting, parties 
continued to publish tickets post-statehood.  Tickets contained the 
party’s preferred candidate for each position, including the party’s 
preference in judicial candidates.  To cast a vote, voters or election 
workers read aloud from the ticket. 
Voting reverted to the territorial system in 1872 with the 
elimination of oral voting.  Tickets printed by the parties again 
became physically essential to casting one’s vote.  For example, the 
files of the Oregon Historical Society hold the “Modern Whig Ticket: 
Republican State Ticket” for the general election of 1876; it listed 
John B. Waldo, E.D. Shattuck, and Seneca Smith for supreme court 
and two district court positions, respectively.110  The voter simply 
inserted the printed ticket into the ballot box.111 
Partisan appeals did not stop with a Delphic listing of the judicial 
candidate’s name on the party ticket.  In an election most likely held 
in 1902, for example, Judges Hamilton, a Democrat, and Potter, a 
Republican, squared off in a contested election for a circuit court 
position.  In an anonymous circular replying to an anonymous circular 
supporting Judge Hamilton, Judge Potter’s supporters made an 
explicitly partisan appeal: 
 
107 Party-prepared ballots became known as “tickets” because they looked like the train 
tickets of the time.  Jill Lepore, Annals of Democracy: Rock, Paper, Scissors: How We 
Used to Vote, NEW YORKER, Oct. 13, 2008, at 88, 93. 
108 The so-called Australian Ballot, or secret ballot, familiar to Oregonians on the 
sesquicentennial, did not become the rule in Oregon until 1891.  PAUL BOURKE & 
DONALD DEBATS, WASHINGTON COUNTY: POLITICS AND COMMUNITY IN ANTEBELLUM 
AMERICA 3–9 (John Hopkins University Press 1995). 
109 OR. CONST. art. II, § 15. 
Viva voce voting “required citizens either to give their votes in the British manner, with a 
loud voice, or to have their written ballot called out by the clerk.”  BOURKE & DEBATS, 
supra note 108, at 4.  To vote, a “voter stepped forward and announced his name.  A clerk 
recorded the name and, as the voter proclaimed aloud each of his political choices, a 
written record of the vote was made.  The voting proceeded, with all the participants aware 
of the choices being made, and the emerging outcome.”  Id. at 10. 
110 Manuscript File 1513, Politics Collection, Box 7, Folder #1, in the Oregon Historical 
Society library. 
111 BOURKE & DEBATS, supra note 108, at 176. 
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The only way to maintain the Republic party in power and 
perpetuate its principles and policies is to support its candidates at 
the polls.  Judge Hamilton is part and parcel of the Democratic 
machine in this district . . . Judge Potter has and will continue to use 
his every influence in support of the Republican party and the grand 
principles for which it stands.  Republicans do not be deceived; the 
office of District Judge is a political office and one of the most 
lucrative within the gift of the people of the district.112 
In 1931, the Legislature made judicial elections nonpartisan.113  
Explicitly partisan appeals nevertheless persisted.  For example, 
William B. Murray sought election in 1956 to the Multnomah County 
Circuit Court.  His campaign committee mailed a flyer bearing a note 
from the campaign’s chair: 
To our Democratic friends: 
 Bill Murray is the only Democrat running for this non-partisan 
position.  He was your Democratic nominee for Attorney General in 
1948. 
 If we are to have a truly non-partisan bench we should not elect 
our Judges exclusively from the Republican Party.114 
Overt partisanship has since faded from most judicial campaigns in 
Oregon.  In 2006, three candidates sought an open Oregon Supreme 
Court position.  Carrying on a long tradition from past judicial 
campaigns, all three candidates included in their respective voters’ 
pamphlet statements personal endorsements, including laudatory 
quotes, from prominent Oregonians.115  None of the endorsements 
invoked any candidate’s party affiliation. 
Other features of the candidates’ voters’ pamphlet statements in the 
primary election of 2006 confirm that organizations with significant 
political and economic policy agendas have turned their attention to 
Oregon’s judicial campaigns.  Two of the candidates for the open 
supreme court position listed endorsements that they had received 
 
112 Manuscript File 1513, Politics Collection, Box 7, Folder #1, in the Oregon Historical 
Society library.  It is not clear when the document was created; the author dates it based on 
a cross-reference it contains to a case reported by the Oregon Supreme Court in a specified 
volume. 
113 Act of Mar. 11, 1931, ch. 347, § 6, 1931 Or. Laws 610. 
114 Manuscript File 1513, Politics Collection, Box 7, Folder #1, in the Oregon Historical 
Society library. 
115 Official Voters’ Pamphlet, Oregon Primary Election, May 16, 2006, 
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/may162006/guide/np/sup_ct.html) (including 
statements of W. Eugene (“Gene”) Hallman, Virginia L. Linder, and Jack Roberts). 
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from groups organized to advance or protect the political or economic 
interest of their members; the third referred readers to the campaign 
website where “other endorsements” were promised.116  Six of the ten 
organizations identified in the voters’ pamphlet as organizational 
endorsements have appeared as parties or amicus in the appellate 
courts of Oregon; two of these six appeared as parties or as amici in 
cases reported during the term for which the candidates were 
contending.117 
Evidence from beyond the pages of the voters’ pamphlet 
demonstrates that voters and commentators believed that important 
policy outcomes depended on the result of the 2006 election.  For 
example, the editor of a self-described blog “for conservative 
Oregonians”118 said of the primary: 
The importance of the Supreme Court vacancy cannot be 
overstated. 
 . . . . 
Jack Roberts would easily be the most fiscally conservative member 
of the Oregon Supreme Court if elected. 
 . . . . 
Linder is endorsed by Judge Merton James and Judge Lipscomb the 
dynamic duo that revoked both property rights Measures 7 & 37 
(and revoked these measures using the most contorted legal 
reasoning imaginable).  Candidate Hallman is former president of 
the Oregon Trail [sic] Lawyers Association—enough said.119 
At least one newspaper conceived of the election in “left” and 
“right” political terms.  In endorsing Linder, the Portland Mercury 
wrote “She’s got a reputation as a moderate who leans right on law 
 
116 Id. 
117 Id.  Candidates included in their voters’pamphlet statements endorsements from the 
organizations listed below.  The parentheticals following the names of the organizations 
note the number of cases in which the organization had appeared separated by a colon 
from the number of appearances in cases that arose during the term for which the 
candidates contended.  Crime Victims United of Oregon (0:0); National Federation of 
Independent Business (4:0); Oregon AFSCME Council 75 (3:0); Oregon Education 
Association (61:3); Oregon Farm Bureau Federation (13:1); Oregon Home Builders 
Association (5:0); Oregon State Firefighters’ Council (4:0); Planned Parenthood PAC of 
Oregon (0:0); Teamsters, Council #37 (0:0); and, UFCW Local 555 (0:0). 
118 Oregon Catalyst.com,  http://www.oregoncatalyst.com/aboutus.php (last visited May 
5, 2009). 
119 Jason Williams, Jack Roberts─A Chance for Change, OREGON CATALYIST.COM, 
May 9, 2006, http://www.oregoncatalyst.com/index.php?/archives/171-Jack-Roberts-a-
chance-for-change.html. 
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and order issues, and left on social policy issues, and she’s earned the 
Oregon Bar Association’s highest rating.”120 
The Multnomah County Democratic Party endorsed Hallman, 
sparking this response from a conservative blog: 
 Oregon has an extremely liberal Supreme Court.  One of the 
more conservative members is retiring.  There are three people 
running to fill that seat.  Gene Hallman is the most liberal, the most 
activist, and the most likely to legislate from the bench. 
 Gene Hallman, if elected, would be the most dangerous man in 
Oregon politics.121 
People and organizations identifying strongly with rival policy 
positions on social, economic, and criminal justice issues did much 
more than talk about the candidates in the 2006 campaign.  They also 
contributed money, time, and other things of value.  Campaign 
contributions, including contributions from people and organizations 
whose endorsements appeared in the candidates’ statements, set 
record levels for Oregon judicial campaigns.122  Between them, the 
three candidates spent approximately $1.4 million in the primary and 
general elections.123 
In their first pre-election campaign contribution and expenditure 
report to the Secretary of State,124 two of the three candidates for the 
supreme court position in 2006 reported contributions from lawyers 
and law firms who appeared on briefs filed in cases decided by the 
appellate courts during the term of office for which they were 
 
120 Amy Jenniges et al., Who You Will Vote for 2006!, PORTLAND MERCURY, May 4, 
2006, http://www.portlandmercury.com/portland/Content?oid=39177&category=34029. 
121 Question: Who is Gene Hallman?, Mar. 8, 2006, http://gullyborg.typepad.com/ 
weblog_archive/2006/03/question_who_is.html (emphasis omitted). 
122 Peter Wong, Spending Sets Record in State’s High Court Race: Judicial Campaigns 
Now Are More Costly in Other States, Too, SALEM STATESMAN J., May 14, 2006, at 1C. 
123 The National Institute on Money in State Politics describes itself as “the only 
nonpartisan, nonprofit organization revealing the influence of campaign money on state-
level elections and public policy in all 50 states.”  Nat’l Inst. on Money in State Politics, 
Mission and History, http://www.followthemoney.org/Institute/index.phtml (last visited 
May 5, 2009).  The Institute reported that Hallman spent $340,763 in his losing bid in the 
primary.  Nat’l Inst. on Money in State Politics, Oregon 2006 Candidates, 
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/state_candidates.phtml?s=OR&y=2
006&f=J (last visited May 5, 2009).  Roberts spent $715,270.  Id.  Linder won the runoff 
in the general election.  She spent $351,802.  Id. 
124 Contributions early in a campaign help the fledgling candidate establish credibility 
and fund the infrastructure necessary for a successful campaign. 
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contending.125  The candidate reporting no contributions in his first 
pre-election report from lawyers or law firms with business before the 
appellate courts nevertheless received two contributions from 
companies with business before the appellate courts.126  All three 
reported receiving contributions from issue-oriented organizations 
during the course of the primary campaign.127 
The fact that lawyers, businesses, or groups interested in the policy 
implications of the court’s work participated in the 2006 election for 
the supreme court position is not surprising.  Delazon Smith, for one, 
might have viewed their participation as enabling the “frequent return 
of power to the people” that he considered a “good rule.”128  Nor does 
the receipt of contributions diminish the strong professional 
attainments of any of the three candidates or mean that any of them, if 
elected, were likely to abandon the independence and probity that 
Justices Kennedy and Breyer observed are preconditions for the rule 
of law.129 
In the runoff election in 2006, both candidates executed and 
maintained a joint pledge to abide voluntarily by certain standards of 
conduct.  As to fundraising, the candidates pledged to “take all 
reasonable steps to ensure that . . . fundraising does not undermine the 
dignity and impartiality of judicial office.”130  Far from 
demonstrating that any of the candidates “prostitute[d] the ermine to 
 
125 See ELECTION FILING REPORT: 2006 PRIMARY ELECTION, OREGON SUPREME 
COURT CANDIDATE HALLMAN (2006), http://egov.sos.state.or.us/division/elections/ 
elec_images/5120_2006_P100_1STPRE.pdf [hereinafter HALLMAN PRE-ELECTION 
REPORT]; ELECTION FILING REPORT: 2006 PRIMARY ELECTION,  OREGON SUPREME 
COURT CANDIDATE LINDER (2006), http://egov.sos.state.or.us/division/elections/elec 
_images/4714_2006_P100_1STPRE.pdf [hereinafter LINDER PRE-ELECTION REPORT]; 
ELECTION FILING REPORT: 2006 PRIMARY ELECTION, OREGON SUPREME COURT 
CANDIDATE ROBERTS (2006), http://egov.sos.state.or.us/division/elections/elec 
_images/4714_2006_P100_1STPRE.pdf [hereinafter ROBERTS PRE-ELECTION REPORT].  
The author compiled a list of contributing attorneys and firms from each candidate’s first 
pre-election report of campaign expenditures to the Oregon Secretary of State, then 
searched reported opinions of the Oregon Court of Appeals and Oregon Supreme Court for 
cases in which the contributors appeared as counsel. 
126 HALLMAN PRE-ELECTION REPORT, supra note 125; LINDER PRE-ELECTION 
REPORT, supra note 125; ROBERTS PRE-ELECTION REPORT, supra note 125. 
127 HALLMAN PRE-ELECTION REPORT, supra note 125; LINDER PRE-ELECTION 
REPORT, supra note 125; ROBERTS PRE-ELECTION REPORT, supra note 125. 
128 STATESMAN (Sept. 1, 1857), supra note 14 (quoting Delazon Smith). 
129 See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 803 (2008) 
(Kennedy & Breyer, JJ., concurring). 
130 Letter from Virginia Linder and Jack Roberts to Chief Justice De Muniz (Sept. 25, 
2006) (on file with the author). 
 934 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 907 
political ends,”131 the history of the 2006 campaign for the Oregon 
Supreme Court position instead demonstrates that even well-qualified 
and strongly independent candidates are trapped by their reliance on 
contributions from motivated contributors.132  The campaign 
underscores the strength of Justice O’Connor’s belief that the harsh 
necessity of contributions creates a perception of indebtedness that in 
turn corrodes public confidence in the judiciary.133 
IV 
PREDICTING THE FUTURE: TWO MODEST REFORMS 
A historian asserted that: “in a recounting of past crimes, the 
proper question to ask is not ‘Who was guilty then?’ unless it leads 
directly to: ‘What is our responsibility now?’”134  Oregon’s original 
decision to select judges by direct competitive election, the reasons 
for that decision, and the state’s experience under that choice are 
recounted above.  Now, what might Oregon do to improve Oregon’s 
system of selecting judges? 
The momentum of our history and the fact that the delegates’ 
original choice continues to solve the enduring tension between the 
principle of judicial supremacy and democratic policy-making 
strongly suggest that Oregonians will not reform their original choice 
by abandoning it.  Oregonians could, by making two changes fully 
consistent with the original choice, approach more closely the 
“guaranty of pure fountains of justice” that Reuben Boise thought in 
1857 ought to be an outcome of a well-designed judiciary.135 
 
131 STATESMAN (Sept. 1, 1857), supra note 14 (quoting Reuben Boise). 
132 “Even though judicial campaign spending has risen more sharply in recent years 
than other campaign spending, and even though high-dollar campaigns have undoubtedly 
affected public perceptions about judicial impartiality, not every judge who has been 
involved in a high-dollar, vigorous campaign can be presumed to have a probability or 
likelihood of bias whenever a matter in which some supporter is vitally interested later 
comes before the judge’s court.”  Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 24–25, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 
33350, 2008 WL 918444 (W. Va. Apr. 3, 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008).  In 
Caperton, “[t]he question presented is whether [a state Supreme Court Justice’s] failure to 
recuse himself from participation in his principal financial supporter’s case violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Brief for Petitioners at i, Caperton, 
2008 WL 918444.  Oral arguments occurred on Tuesday, March 3, 2009.  Transcript of 
Oral Argument, Caperton, 2008 WL 527723. 
133 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
134 HOWARD ZINN, HOWARD ZINN ON HISTORY 207 (2001). 
135 STATESMAN (Sept. 1, 1857), supra note 14 (quoting Reuben P. Boise). 
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A.  Public Financing of Direct Competitive Judicial Elections 
Judicial campaigns will demand larger and larger contributions 
from lawyers and litigants with business before the courts.  
Campaign-finance disclosure laws and the increasingly near real-time 
transparency of campaign-contribution records ironically would 
enhance the appearance of impropriety inherent in the current system 
of privately funded judicial campaigns.  Detailed campaign 
contribution and expenditure reports filed with the Oregon Secretary 
of State before 2004 are accessible to the public in paper only.  For 
reports filed between 2004 and January 1, 2007, complete reports are 
publicly available online but in a format that cannot readily be 
searched by contributor, amount of contribution, or other important 
details.  Oregon’s online ORSTAR system now permits any interested 
person to conduct detailed and flexible searches of reports submitted 
by candidates.136  Future direct competitive judicial elections in 
Oregon eventually will feature dueling advertisements stating, 
accurately, that the campaigns of rival candidates are fueled by 
“special interest” groups.  Advertising of that ilk will reinforce the 
perception that private campaign contributions buy special access to 
biased justice. 
No rules forbid private contact with a legislator about a bill 
pending in the Legislative Assembly or, with few exceptions, with 
any other elected official in Oregon.  Proponents of a given outcome 
may meet privately with an elected decision-maker about any 
contested matter, and few opponents of the position discussed in that 
private meeting would assert a right based in law to be present.  An 
elected decision-maker may decide not to hear an interested person’s 
concerns at all; if the official does make a decision, he or she is not 
restricted in most cases to any record in making the decision. 
Lobbyists sometimes assert that the only thing they gain from 
making campaign contributions is access of the type just described.  
One case study concluded from interviews with lobbyists “that there 
are [sic] a significant minority of legislators who give preferential 
treatment to large donors and are much more willing to meet with 
individuals who help to keep them in office.”137  The same purpose 
expressed with respect to judicial candidates contradicts deep-seated 
 
136 See Or. Sec’y of State, Elections Division, ORESTAR, https://secure.sos.state.or.us/ 
eim/transactionPubDetail.do?tranRsn=443317 (last visited May 5, 2009). 
137 Trevor D. Dryer, Gaining Access: A State Lobbying Case Study, 23 J.L. & POL. 283, 
314 (2007). 
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values about the impartiality of the judiciary.  With limited 
exceptions, no judge is permitted to meet secretly with a party,138 and 
no party is allowed to make an ex parte approach to the court on the 
merits of a case.139  Judges must restrict their decision-making to a 
fixed record that is, in nearly every aspect, equally transparent to all 
parties to the case.  In the judicial context, the very aim of a private 
campaign contribution is inimical to the judicial process. 
Public financing of judicial campaigns could free the judicial-
selection process from the perceptions of indebtedness and special 
access that increasingly and inevitably attend privately financed direct 
competitive elections.140  Public financing would leave undisturbed 
the choice Oregonians made 150 years ago and have maintained ever 
since.  Although many difficulties would be encountered in creating 
an effective system, the concept has been subjected to detailed 
study141 and other states have begun to experiment with models of the 
system.142  Oregon could draw on those sources to help shape its own 
system. 
B.  Lengthen Judicial Terms 
The debate at the constitutional convention in 1857 demonstrates 
that Oregonians did not intend for their original choice to create a 
system in which judges were simply wind vanes for popular 
passions.143  The six-year term ultimately established at the 
 
138 REVISED OREGON CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT JR 2-102(B) (1996), 
http://www.ojd.state.or.us/web/OJDPublications.nsf/Files/CJC.pdf/$File/CJC.pdf (“A 
judge shall not communicate . . . with a lawyer or party about any matter in an adversary 
proceeding outside the course of the proceeding, except with the consent of the parties or 
as expressly authorized by law or permitted by this rule.”). 
139 See, e.g., OREGON RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(b) (2006) (“A lawyer shall 
not: . . . communicate ex parte on the merits of a cause with [a judge, juror, prospective 
juror or other official] during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court 
order.”). 
140 The question presented in Caperton would be irrelevant in a jurisdiction in which 
judges were selected in publicly funded, direct popular elections.  Brief for Petitioners at i, 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2008 WL 918444 (W. Va. Apr. 3, 2008), 
cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008). 
141 E.g., AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, PUBLIC 
FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 27 (2002) (describing then-existing Wisconsin 
system). 
142 N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Pol. Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427 
(4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 490 (2008) (upholding aspects of North Carolina’s 
system of public financing of judicial elections against First Amendment attack). 
143 Supra text accompanying notes 26–29. 
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convention and maintained ever since is longer than provided for any 
other term of constitutional office.  It is an inexact effort to identify a 
midpoint between delegates’ reconciliation of judicial review with a 
democratic order and the risk to judicial independence posed by direct 
competitive elections. 
The history of judicial campaigns in Oregon since 1859 is more 
remarkable for its restraint than for its excess.144  The Revised 
Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct models this restraint, prohibiting “a 
judicial candidate” from making “pledges or promises of conduct in 
office that could inhibit or compromise the faithful, impartial and 
diligent performance of the duties of the” judicial office sought.145  
However, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White146 casts doubt on 
the constitutionality of content-based speech restrictions on 
candidates for judicial positions.  White makes less likely repetition of 
the self-restraint demanded by the Oregon Code and exhibited by the 
runoff candidates in Oregon’s last contested supreme court 
election,147 and makes more likely the kind of “electioneering” that 
some delegates feared.148 
In White, the Court concluded that Minnesota’s canons of judicial 
conduct violated the First Amendment by prohibiting candidates for 
judicial election in that state from announcing their views on disputed 
legal and political issues.149  Since White, Oregon’s code has not been 
tested against First Amendment attack.  Whatever its legal effect, 
White almost inevitably will embolden judicial candidates to tack ever 
more closely to the winds of popular passion.  Had White been 
decided on the eve of the constitutional convention, delegates might 
have calculated the term-length midpoint differently. 
Longer terms dampen the influence of popular passion in at least 
two ways.  First, if one assumed that candidates for judicial office 
were most tempted to “prostitute the ermine for political ends” during 
campaigns, then the window of greatest vulnerability could be cut in 
half by doubling terms.  Second, increasing the interval between 
elections also increases the possibility that the passions driving 
 
144 Supra text accompanying notes 80–110. 
145 REVISED OREGON CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT JR 4-102(B) (1996).  The 
prohibition applies to incumbents seeking reelection and to declared candidates.  Id. at JR 
4–104. 
146 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
147 See supra text accompanying notes 130–32. 
148 STATESMAN (Sept. 1, 1857), supra note 14. 
149 536 U.S. at 788. 
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interest in a given issue pending before the court will have been 
settled by political or social compromise before a judge who rendered 
an unpopular, but nonetheless principled, decision faces reelection. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Oregonians created and have maintained against all attacks a 
system of direct popular election of judges.  That system, however, 
risks creation of a perception of indebtedness that in turn corrodes 
public confidence in the independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary.  Publicly funding judicial campaigns and lengthening terms 
of office would reduce that risk. 
 
 
